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MARC – Mergers & Acquisitions Research Centre 
MARC is the Mergers and Acquisitions Research Centre at Cass Business School, City 
University London – the first research centre at a major business school to pursue focussed 
leading-edge research into the global mergers and acquisitions industry. 
MARC blends the expertise of M&A accountants, bankers, lawyers, consultants and other 
key market participants with the academic excellence of Cass to provide fresh insights into 
the world of deal-making. 
Corporations, regulators, professional services firms, exchanges and universities use MARC 
for swift access to research and practical ideas. From deal origination to closing, from 
financing to integration, from the hottest emerging markets to the board rooms of the biggest 
corporations, MARC researches the wide spectrum of mergers, acquisitions and corporate 
restructurings. 
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Overview
t’s different this time’… is certainly a 
phrase that’s been used for subjects 
ranging from the 2000 equity market 
valuations to the prospects of England at the 
football World Cup. But unlike in 
mathematical proof or scientific 
experimentation, finance theories are not 
fixed in their validity. That validity can have a 
time limit.  
And in that light, historically viewed as being 
negative for the acquiring company, M&A 
acquisitions are now seen as being more 
positive by many who use more recent data, 
despite there being those who stick fast to 
the earlier, albeit out-dated, research.  But is 
this actually the case? 
First, what could be the explanation for 
improving returns being observed for 
acquirers in M&A? 
1. Maybe corporates are learning and 
executing better (not the focus of 
this report but we touch on a couple 
of potential explanations at the 
end)? 
 
2. A mix effect. Corporates are doing 
the ‘right’ sort of deals 
 
3. Has analysis improved to pick up 
the value creation? 
 
We set out to investigate the premise and 
the possible reasons for the change, with a 
particular emphasis on success rates of 
acquisitions of unlisted companies (referred 
to here as Private deals) versus those of 
listed companies (referred to as Public 
deals) and the changes in success observed 
before and after the bubble of 2000. The 
basis of our report is a meta-analysis of 86 
studies in the field. 
The latter two explanations above are 
clearly valid in our view of the literature. The 
connection between the two explanations is 
Private deals -- and that is the focus of this 
report. We have found an increase in the 
prevalence of Private deals, from 66% of 
acquisitions by listed firms in the period 
1984-1999 (inclusive) to 78% in the period 
2000-2015. 
Combine that fact with more analysis of 
private deal making and the dramatic 
(positive) results for Private deals that are 
shown in this report and in our opinion you 
are a long way to an explanation. 
Private deals don’t have to be small as they 
can be transformational. In what is now 
branded one of the top 15 tech acquisitions 
of all time, Google bought private company 
Applied Semantics for $102 million in April 
2003. Within 2 years it represented 15% of 
Google’s revenues. 
And if not operationally transformational, 
such can be large enough to make a big 
difference to the balance sheet. In 2005 
Google bought unlisted Skype for $2.6bn. It 
was sold for $8.5bn in 2011. 
 
Figure 1: Number of studies by outcome (totals on RHS) (Source: Cass Business School) 
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Background (the journey so far)
he conventional wisdom that M&A 
destroys value for the acquiring 
company is probably a consequence of 
two things: the first conclusions of academic 
research and the high visibility of certain value 
destructive mega-mergers (AOL/Time Warner 
for example).  
The early findings 
With regards to the success of the acquiring 
firm, it was generally undisputed that a 
majority of merger activity in the 1980’s and 
90’s fell short of expectations, being unable to 
materialise synergistic opportunities. A study 
conducted by Booz-Allen & Hamilton in 20011, 
concluded that irrespective of the measuring 
approach (stock price, revenue or return on 
equity) a majority of deals did not meet 
expectations. Further, many empirical studies, 
examining value creation for acquiring firm 
shareholders, found that M&A deals often led 
to firm value destruction (Buckley & Ghauri 
20022; Brunner 20043; Habeck et al 20004; 
Agrawal & Jaffe 19925; among many others).  
Notably, academic research on bidders for 
Public targets generally reported insignificant 
or negative abnormal returns to the acquirers. 
Graham et al. in 20026 extracted a sample of 
356 acquisitions of public targets from 1980 to 
1995, and found that on average, bidders 
suffer a negative abnormal return of -0.78%, 
significant at the 1% level. Andrade et al. in 
2001 7  examined the acquisitions of public 
targets in the 1980’s (1,226 acquisitions) and 
1990’s (1,864 acquisitions), and found a 
statistically insignificant return for the bidders.  
                                                            
1 Adolph,G. Booz‐Allen and Hamilton, 2001 
2 Buckley, P. and Ghauri, P. International mergers and 
acquisitions, 2002 
3 Bruner, R. Applied mergers and acquisitions, 2004 
4 Habeck, M., Kroger, F. and Tram, M. After the merger, 2000 
5 Agrawal, A., Jaffe, J. and Mandelker, G. The Journal of Finance, 
1992 
6 Graham, J.R., Lemmon, M.L. and Wolf, J.G. The Journal of 
Finance, 2002 
7 Andrade, G., Mitchell, M. and Stafford, E. The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 2001 
Looking specifically at the UK, Sudarsanam 
and Mahate 8  (2003) and Cosh, Guest and 
Hughes 9  (2006) have found significantly 
negative returns to bidders, ranging across 
both studies from -9% to -22%. The former 
focused on UK transactions from 1983 to 1995 
whereas the latter considered data from 1985 
to 1996. Baker and Limmack10 (2002) in their 
60-month study confirmed the value-
destructive impact of UK acquisitions on the 
bidder's share price. According to their study, 
5-year abnormal returns range between -26% 
and -31%. To sum up, the vast majority of 
studies of long horizon abnormal returns 
reported negative and significant results with 
only a few showing break-even or positive 
results. 
Importantly, except as noted above, all of 
these studies looked at public deals only, often 
because it was easiest to calculate returns as 
the data was readily available. 
The significance of Private Deals (the 
acquisition of unlisted equity) 
Chang11 (1998) was the first scholar to stratify 
the acquirer’s abnormal return based on the 
ownership type of the target firm. His starting 
point was the idea that a stock acquisition of a 
public target represents a public offering of 
equity, whereas a stock acquisition of a private 
target represents a private placement of 
equity. Since secondary equity offerings are 
associated with a negative signal as described 
in Smith12 (1986) whilst private placements are 
viewed favourably, as seen in Baker & Wruck13 
(1989), there was a reason to believe that a 
similar reaction exists for stock acquisitions of 
Public and Private firms. Indeed, using a 
sample of 154 Public and 150 Private target 
acquisitions financed with stocks, the research 
found that acquisitions of Public firms had an 
                                                            
8 Sudarsanam, S. and Mahate, A. J Bus Fin & Acc, 2003  
9 Cosh, A., Guest, P. and Hughes, A. J Bus Fin & Acc, 2006 
10 Baker, R.D. and Limmack, R.J. Univ. of Stirling, 2002 
11 Chang, S. The Journal of Finance, 1998 
12 Smith, C. Journal of Financial Economics, 1986 
13 Baker, G. and Wruck, K. Journal of Financial Economics, 1989 
T
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average short term abnormal loss of -2.46%, 
compared to an abnormal gain of 2.64% for 
Private targets. Conversely, the paper found 
that cash financed acquisitions yield 
insignificant excess returns regardless of the 
target type.  
Eight years later, Draper and Paudyal14 (2006) 
highlighted that 80% of mergers involve private 
targets, and yet these mergers receive minimal 
attention in academic literature. Similarly, 
Tsai 15  (2008) noted that the majority of 
research on M&As conclude that acquirers 
suffer from a negative stock market reaction, 
but they typically confine their samples to 
listed targets. Using a sample between 1993 
and 1999, Tsai finds that the abnormal returns 
to acquirers of unlisted targets using cash 
payments are positive and significant.  
A new world? 
With the turn of the new millennium, numerous 
factors  had altered the M&A landscape, 
facilitating successful mergers that have, thus 
far, passed the test of time (one such example 
is the creation of Verizon before 2000 from the 
merger first of Bell Atlantic with NYNEX and 
then with GTE). Internet developments and the 
technological boom have eased and improved 
various aspects of the M&A deal process (pre 
and post integration communication, due 
diligence, research, etc.). Regulatory changes 
brought in by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
fostered a zero-tolerance environment, 
increasing accountability and transparency in 
the performance of due diligence and the 
execution of mergers. Interestingly, the same 
consulting firm mentioned earlier (Booz and 
Company 16 ) had re-assessed M&A success 
levels, concluding that in the intervening years 
(2001-2006), success levels had significantly 
improved. Further, a joint study conducted by 
Cass Business School and Towers Perrin 
examined that whilst previously acquirer 
shareholder performance was negative relative 
to the market, performance of acquirers in 
                                                            
14 Draper, P. and Paudyal, K. European Financial Management, 
2006 
15 Tsai, C. Journal of Accounting, Finance & Management 
Strategy, 2008 
16 Adolph, G. Booz and Company, 2007 
deals in the sixth merger wave (2003-2006) 
was positive compared to the market17.  
The same conclusion was further supported by 
McKinsey18, attesting that the that recent M&A  
boom (2003-2006) appeared to create: 
“proportionally more value for the shareholders 
of acquiring companies”. Recent empirical 
studies have further confirmed that on 
average, M&A activity does create value for 
the acquiring shareholder (Netter, Stegemoller 
& Wintocki, 201119).  
And returning to the UK, Skovbjerg in 201520 
for example, finds positive and significant 
returns to European buyer shareholders, 
including the UK, in both the short and long-
term.  The final sample that was analysed in 
this research included 1637 EU deals between 
1997 and 2010.  
So we are at a point where the value of M&A is 
being reassessed and rather than being 
dismissed as value destructive, more thought 
is being given to the question of what has 
changed and what are the success factors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
17 This study performed by Cass Business School and Towers 
Perrin examined 218 international deals completed in 
1988,1998 & 2004. Using company performance both 6 months 
prior and after deal closing, the average M&A deal performance 
vs. market was: 1980’s at ‐6.40%, 1990’s at ‐2.5% and 2004/5 at 
+8.8% (Moeller & Brady, 2007); (Business Wire, 2006)  
18 Dobbs, R., Goedhart, M. and Suonio, H. The McKinsey 
Quarterly, 2006 
19 Netter, J., Stegemoller, M. and Wintocki, M. Managerial 
Finance, 2011 
20 Skovbjerg, N.M. Aarhus University, 2015 
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1. Integration Process Performance
2. Overall Acquisition Performance
3. Employee Retention
4. Customer Retention
5. Accounting Performance
6. Long-term Financial Performance
7. Short-term Financial Performance
8. Acquisition Survival
9. Innovation Performance
10. Knowledge Transfer
11. Systems Conversion
12. Variation in Market Share
How do you measure M&A success? 
nalysing whether an M&A transaction is 
successful is difficult. From a purist 
perspective it should be about value 
creation for the shareholders of the acquiring 
company. But over what time period? Do we 
assume that the market has judged the deal 
correctly? How can we tell what part of a share 
price move is due to the deal, especially for 
serial acquirers? Do we trust accounting 
measures? Are other stakeholders important if 
we are thinking about the long-term business 
franchise? Should we look at the operational 
execution? As outsiders, can we really look at 
the operational execution? It’s hard. 
Zollo and Meier in 200821 identified 12 different 
approaches to measure the success of M&A 
deals. These are: 
Of course, the most important factor may really 
be to identify what the board of directors 
planned for the acquisition when deciding to 
execute the deal, but even if there’s a press 
release that outlines the deal drivers, were 
these really the ones that the directors had 
discussed internally? 
The authors of the aforementioned paper point 
out that the most commonly used analytical 
practices to determine success include event 
                                                            
21  Zollo,  M.  and  Meier,D.  Academy  of  Management 
Perspectives, 2008 
studies in both the short and long-term, 
accounting-based measures, subjective 
assessments from managers’, industry 
experts’ assessments and divestment-based 
measures. The first two methods largely 
dominate the total number of studies.  
Event studies 
Event studies calculate the abnormal stock 
price effect following the unanticipated 
announcement of M&A deals. Short-term 
studies are designed to reflect how the market 
perceives information about the 
announcement. Long-term studies are in turn 
designed to provide an ex-post picture about 
value created through the transaction when all 
synergies have been realized. Both studies are 
based on share price performance relative to 
an expected movement, whether it be defined 
by a capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the 
acquirer’s competitors who are not making 
acquisitions (that is, the return of a stock’s 
sector index often adjusted for size and 
geography) or some other basis. 
Whether short-term event studies are 
meaningful measures of M&A success is 
determined by your view of the efficiency of 
the stock market. Market efficiency refers to 
the assumption that all relevant information 
available is quickly incorporated in market 
prices that ought to reflect the discounted sum 
of the expected cash flows delivered by 
particular stock. In this case the share price 
move upon the deal announcement is taken as 
representing the value destruction or value 
creation of the deal. Two of the obvious 
weaknesses of such a standpoint are the 
influence of merger arbitrage funds (buying the 
target stock, selling the acquirer regardless of 
the merits or otherwise of the transaction) and 
whether the future of what may be a complex 
transaction can really be established in just a 
few days post-merger. There is also a danger 
that the deal may not have been evaluated on 
its own merits but on the success or failure of 
the previous deals by the company, the market 
A
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assuming that if a company got the last deal 
right it is more likely to do so the next time. 
Long-term event studies are potentially even 
more flawed given the large number of impacts 
on a share price likely to be seen in a longer 
time window that are unrelated to the particular 
M&A deal. Not only that, but there may be 
multiple acquisitions, making isolation of each 
deal’s impact all but impossible. 
Performance studies 
Another major class of studies of “success of 
M&A” is represented by performance studies 
that look at changes in accounting measures 
of the acquiring company, normally comparing 
them with industry-wide averages to have a 
counter-factual of how the company might 
have performed had it not carried out the 
transaction. Similar to long-term event studies, 
they are applied to obtain an ex-post picture of 
the effect of M&A transactions on the 
fundamentals of bidding corporations rather 
than a short-term public view on the future 
profitability of the bidder following deal 
notification.
There is no consensus between academics 
and practitioners regarding what accounting 
measures to use in the performance-based 
studies. Different papers have looked at a 
variety of metrics, including profitability 
measured by return on assets (ROA) and 
return on equity (ROE), cash flow performance 
measures (Healy, Palepu and Ruback, 
199222), innovation indicators (Bertrand, 2009 
23), sales growth and others.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                            
22  Healy,  P.,  Palepu,  K.  and  Ruback,  R.  Journal  of  Financial 
Economics, 1992 
23 Bertrand, O. Research Policy, 2009 
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Our analysis 
&A activity can be segmented in a 
variety of ways, such as type of 
target, size, form of payment and so 
on. This report primarily considers the 
research conducted on acquisitions involving a 
publicly-listed target, compared to acquisitions 
involving an unlisted target. Historically, the 
empirical findings show a distinct difference in 
the performance of these two categories 
(Chang 1998). This reports’ other major ‘cut’ is 
between pre-2000 and post-2000 acquisitions. 
Research limitations 
Krishnakumar 24  (2012) reviewed existing 
literature on M&A to identify and assess the 
methodologies used to measure deal success. 
One of the findings is that different 
methodologies lead to contradictory 
conclusions. Hence, to compare like-for-like in 
the pre-and post-2000 periods (and for public 
versus private targets), the same success 
measure must be used. And in this light we 
choose short-term event studies as our 
methodology.  
One of the main criticisms of the short-term 
event study methodology (as mentioned 
above) is that it assumes market efficiency, as 
it is based on the hypothesis that the stock 
market reaction to the announcement of a deal 
is a reliable measure of the expected outcome 
to the bidder. This assumption is particularly 
problematic in emerging economies with weak 
capital markets (again Krishnakumar, 2012). 
However, this shortcoming has no impact on 
our research, as we have restricted the study 
to developed markets. As currently in M&A 
there is a predominance of acquirers being 
based in developed economies with strong 
capital markets, we do not see this rule as 
having a significant impact on overall 
conclusions.  
Hence, for the purposes of this research, using 
short-term abnormal returns (versus a CAPM 
based counterfactual) despite its shortcomings 
                                                            
24 Krishnakumar, D. Academy of Accounting and Financial 
Studies Journal, 2012 
is, we believe, the most suitable measure of 
success. Additionally, given the significance 
we ascribe to Private acquisitions, which by 
their nature and size usually have lower levels 
of disclosure, attempting to study changes in 
accounting performance measures would be 
less feasible.  
Methodology  
This report is based on meta-analysis of 
academic papers that used short-term event 
study methods to investigate the success of 
M&A pre- and post-2000 and with a specific 
emphasis on finding the difference in 
performance of Public versus Private 
acquisitions. Here we detail the criteria used 
when deciding which academic papers we 
included in our findings. 
1. The research has been published, to 
ensure that only credible material is 
used. 
 
2. The sample used should fall in this 
study’s time frame, which is from 1980 
to 2015. 
 
3. The acquirer must be based in a 
developed market, such as the US or 
the UK, given the known differences in 
the performance of M&A between 
developed and emerging markets and 
the difficulty in legitimately applying 
the CAPM hypothesis to the latter. 
Moreover, mergers in emerging 
markets constituted a small 
percentage of the global takeover 
markets in the pre-2000 period, 
leading the majority of scholars to 
focus on developed markets.   
 
4. The definition of success is short-term 
shareholder return. Abnormal returns 
estimated using CAPM is a widely 
used measure of return, and using a 
short window is preferred because it 
eliminates the impact of other events
M 
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0.28%
-2.10%
-0.50% -0.74%
1.00%
2.16% 2.17%
1.70%
-3.00%
-2.00%
-1.00%
0.00%
1.00%
2.00%
3.00%
Cash Stock Mixed Total
Public Private
0.00%
-2.90%
-1.34%
0.00%
2.84%
2.37%
Cash Stock Total
Public Private
(Andrade et al. 200125). Typically, this 
measure of return is estimated using 
an event study methodology, following 
Brown and Warner 26(1985). 
 
5. The sample is not limited to a single 
industry, to avoid a restrictive sample. 
Our findings – investigation count 
We reviewed 86 studies with the breakdown 
shown in the Appendix. 
The table below shows the number of studies 
and whether the outcome was statistically 
significant positive performance, no significant 
result or significant negative performance. 
The simplest finding is from the last columns 
which show the shift from pre-2000, when the 
studies were split very evenly between positive 
return, insignificant return and negative return, 
and post 2000 where no studies showed a 
significant negative return and the vast 
majority of studies showed a positive return. 
Moving from there to the left we find the 
general studies over the period (those with no 
Private/Public demarcation) had 19 papers 
finding positive abnormal returns for an 
acquisition and no papers finding a statistically 
significant negative return.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Looking at the more granular data we find not 
a single paper showing a statistically 
significant negative return for Private 
acquisitions, whereas we still see a 
preponderance of negative returns for Public 
acquisitions  
Our findings – investigation returns 
The charts below show the mean of the 
average abnormal returns found in the 
academic studies. ‘0%‘ indicates an 
insignificant result. 
. 
                                                            
25 Andrade, G., Mitchell, M. and Stafford, E. The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 2001 
26 Brown, S.J. and Warner, J.B. Journal of Financial Economics, 
1985 
Here we see a clear quantification of not just 
the superiority of the Private deals but even an 
improvement seen in those deals’ performance 
over the pre 2000 period. Taking this analysis 
and combining it with the increasing 
prevalence of Private deals here is one clear 
explanation, and support for, the improving 
success of M&A. In addition, it supports the 
viewpoint that those ‘early’ negative views of 
M&A success were distorted by the fact that 
the analysis was primarily being conducted in 
the Public sphere. 
Figure 2: Mean of the average observed abnormal returns 
pre 2000 (Source: Cass Business School) 
 
Figure 3: Mean of the average observed abnormal returns 
post 2000 (Source: Cass Business School) 
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Beyond the Private/Public split and 
conclusions 
 
part from the above explanations, other 
theories have been suggested to 
explain an apparent improvement in 
M&A returns, and we briefly discuss them in 
this section, while also concluding on our final 
position. Clearly the likely explanation is a 
mixture of all those issues discussed above.  
Potential explanations  
One of the first observers to note the 
improvement in acquirer success, Boschetti 
(Towers Perrin, 2006) attributed the new found 
M&A success to changes in corporate 
behaviour including: better deal governance, 
deal selection and focus on integration 28 . 
Broadly, these observations can be divided 
into five categories as discussed by later 
researchers. 
i) Increased shareholder activism 
(Papadakis, 200729) 
 
It is important to acknowledge that whilst there 
is data to support the viewpoint that 
institutional activism benefits the target 
company, there are no empirical studies 
conducted as yet that would allow us to 
evaluate the success of an M&A deal for the 
acquiring firm subjected to shareholder 
activism. This is due to the fact that most 
research examining institutional activism 
assesses activist campaigns as a whole and 
does not focus on M&A-related campaigns in 
isolation. However, an interesting study 
conducted by Ferreira, Massa and Matos30 in 
2009 assesses the role of foreign shareholders 
in the context of cross-border acquisitions. The 
researchers find a positive relationship 
between foreign institutional ownership and 
growing cross-border activity and conclude 
that foreign institutional ownership increases 
                                                            
28 Boschetti, A. Business Wire, 2006 
29 Papadakis, V. Business Strategy Series, 2007 
30 Ferreira, M., Massa, M. and Matos, P. Review of Financial 
Studies (2009) 
the probability that the cross-border M&A deal 
is successful. 
ii) Shift from diversification-related to 
strategic/consolidation-oriented deals 
(Adolph, 200731) 
 
The diversification-based conglomerate 
mergers of the 1960s and early 1970s were 
not based on obvious synergies or an ability to 
change market structure to the benefit of the 
corporate. Given that shareholders can 
themselves diversify through owning shares in 
different companies without having to pay 
acquisition premiums or the inherent and 
significant deal costs, it is hard to see how 
those conglomerate company shareholders 
benefitted, unlike management who benefited 
from running a larger company or whose 
diversification made the company more 
resilient through the business cycle, useful 
when you are the CEO, or indeed any 
employee.  
In contrast today’s deals are in large part 
either based on consolidating a market to 
benefit from cost synergies (or, where allowed, 
a change in industry structure) or on gaining 
access to new high growth technological or 
geographical avenues. Or a deal like the 
merger of Anheuser-Busch InBev and 
SABMiller in 2016, which hits both points. 
iii) Lower target premium payments 
coupled with greater share of cash 
deals (Dobbs, Goedhart & Suonio, 
2006 32) 
 
If we look at our findings above, we find that 
even the usually negatively-received Public 
deals can have a positive market response if 
carried out with cash rather than stock. If more 
deals are being carried out with cash, then it 
follows that there should be an improvement in 
deal returns overall. Lower premiums simply 
                                                            
31 Adolph, G. Booz and Company, 2007 
32 Dobbs, R., Goedhart,M and Suonio, H. McKinsey Quarterly, 
2006 
A
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mean a greater share of a deal’s benefits for 
the acquirers’ shareholders and clearly a 
greater likelihood of deal success as defined 
for the acquiring company. 
iv) Improved management of the M&A 
process (Boschetti in Business Wire 
as above, 2006) 
 
This is logical if we believe that we learn from 
past mistakes. From our research it seems 
that management are starting to see the 
benefits of multiple (Private mainly) bolt-on 
acquisitions rather than Public mega-mergers. 
Given that this is likely based on previous 
experience it is not a stretch to assume that 
management are also learning from mistakes 
in deal execution, supported by the greater 
availability of deal case studies, among other 
things.  Despite the rise in volume of mega-
deals in the past several years, grabbing a 
disproportionate number of inches of 
journalistic coverage, these deals do remain 
small in number. 
v) Improvements in corporate 
governance 
 
Developments in corporate governance 
mechanisms, such as the introduction of CEO 
stock-based compensation (Hall & Liebman, 
199833). Additionally and more recently, there 
is increased board monitoring and the passing 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 would all 
likely limit the propensity of CEO’s to carry out 
the kind of mega-mergers where their own 
interests would diverge from those of their 
shareholders.  
Conclusions 
We see a number of reasons why M&A is 
becoming more successful, which gives 
credibility to the increasing volume of evidence 
that this improvement is actually the case. This 
report focused on the importance of Private 
targets to the success likelihood of acquirers 
as it is arguably the clearest success factor.  It 
is also suggestive that M&A ‘was never as bad 
as we thought’ and that the early negative 
analytical results may have been at least partly 
due to a question of scope in those early 
                                                            
33 Hall, B. and Liebman, J. SSRN Electronic Journal, 1998 
studies. For companies, the message is clear: 
Private bolt-ons and not mega mergers are the 
way to go. For equity analysts and investors, 
the message is also clear: track those bolt-
ons, and maybe rethink your gut reaction to an 
M&A announcement. 
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Appendix
The table below presents the number of observations collected. Undefined refers to situations where 
the payment method was not specified in the research. The last row is for research carried out without 
a Public/Private split. 
Figure 4: Investigations included by type of transaction and deal currency (Source: Cass Business School) 
 Pre-2000      
  Cash Stock Mixed Undefined Total 
Public 12 10 8 5 35 
Private 8 7 5 0 20 
 Post-2000      
  Cash Stock Mixed Undefined Total 
Public 1 1 0 3 5 
Private 1 1 0 3 5 
 Both      
  Cash Stock Mixed Undefined Total 
Both 8 6 7 0 21 
 
Figure 5: Number of studies by outcome (totals on RHS) (Source: Cass Business School) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre 2000 
Public 
Pre 2000 
Private 
Post 2000 
Public 
Post 2000 
Private 
General 
studies 
Pre 2000 
All 
Post 
2000 All 
Positive 5 18 0 4 19 21 25 
Not 
significant 14 2 2 1 2 18 3 
Negative 16 0 3 0 0 19 0 
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